EU policy, fisheries management and the need for resilient networks after Brexit
It probably goes without saying that the European policy-making system is dense and highly complex, as is the influence of the EU political landscape.
For example, EU policies can have major impacts beyond the EU itself, especially non-EU countries near its borders. To manage this complex relationship and the territorial “spillover” of EU politics, third countries (jargon for non-member states that have extensive trade relations with the EU) have developed well-established networking techniques to ensure the representation of their interests.
As a new third country, the UK still has to engage with the EU and, on the one hand, the UK is in an advantageous position: as an old Member State, it knows and understands the EU political process. On the other hand, it has not yet developed the institutions, strategies and frameworks that other third states must engage with the EU as a foreigner.
In our recent article published in the British Journal of Politics and International Relationswe argue that “network resilience” can be used as a concept to understand and decipher how third countries access and influence EU policy.
We have come to the conclusion that a network resilience perspective is useful for understanding fisheries policy in light of the fact that policy requires ongoing and well-managed engagement with neighbours.
We sought to explore what the UK could learn from other third countries/territories significantly affected by EU fisheries policy: Iceland, Norway and the Faroe Islands.
We show that network resilience has an institutional dimension that consists of treaties and formal agreements. A second political dimension refers to the ability to exploit formal and informal entry points to influence policy-making at EU level, and the willingness to seize these opportunities to achieve policy objectives in third countries. .
A third political dimension refers to the internal functioning of networks (composed of civil servants, industry and fisheries organisations) so that they can mobilize to be able to influence decision-making by having the capacities , political knowledge and the ability to learn on an ongoing basis.
So what can the UK learn from other third countries? In terms of the institutional dimension, third countries have limited formal institutional links with EU political processes in fisheries policy. Yet third countries benefit from framework treaties and stable agreements with the EU, even if they do not directly cover fisheries. The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (ACT) was drafted under intense political pressure (unlike the agreements concluded by the three countries studied). It includes fishing provisions, but these, and several other parts of the ACT, remain controversial.
As such, the institutional basis for conducting stable negotiations and providing access to political networks is currently weak. This was recently exemplified by the fishing dispute around Jersey, which essentially stemmed from a lack of clarity in the TCA on what evidence was sufficient to prove historic fishing activity. That said, the UK continues to be part of wider international agreements and treaties that manage fish stocks. These agreements provide a basis for continuity as well as an entry point for engagement with EU actors.
Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands also demonstrate that more informal aspects of the political and strategic dimension are important for network resilience. Here, the multi-level nature of political engagement with the EU, including negotiations at EU level as well as bilateral discussions with EU Member States, are important factors. The immediate post-Brexit period is indicative of the multilevel challenges facing third countries.
Again, the Jersey fishery dispute provides an example of this dynamic on many levels. The EU sees tensions over fisheries as part of wider ACT challenges, while France, at least domestically, is largely concerned about domestic political drivers (particularly with an upcoming presidential election) .
Locally, economic considerations are the main drivers. Identifying and nurturing political relationships at and across all of these levels will be crucial to building a resilient network.
For the UK, domestic politics is also important. The political importance of fisheries in the constitutional debate is significant, particularly in Scotland, which has the largest fishing sector in the UK.
The Scottish National Party has been accused of taking two seemingly contradictory positions on fisheries policies. He has a history of outright opposing the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), calling for a decentralization of fishing powers to EU fishing nations, while also supporting maintaining the EU membership (and by extension compliance with the CFP) – both as part of the UK or as an independent country.
What is important in the context of network resilience is that the UK government dominates the formal institutional dimension of network resilience, particularly in terms of influence in regional and international fisheries governance organization, but that the Scottish government has more room for maneuver in terms of policy and political dimension.
In terms of the political dimension, Brexit means that the UK no longer has formal access to EU political processes and to some extent this has to be balanced with informal access points. As a result, the UK will need to develop the resources and capabilities needed to build and maintain these informal hotspots.
This includes maintaining a “presence” in Brussels to keep informal relationships open and gather information on policy proposals, to maintain knowledge of EU policy processes and the “rules of the game”, and to maintain links with scientific communities. It will also be necessary for the UK government to consider whether there needs to be greater political leadership capabilities to build coalitions with other non-EU coastal states to interface with policymaking processes. EU policies.
The big picture here is that a post-Brexit UK cannot afford to ignore EU politics, but must rethink its relationship with its European partners and find institutions, frameworks and strategies that provide long-term stability and certainty. Network resilience is a useful concept for documenting how networks evolve and respond to major policy changes.
By Chris Huggins, Arno van der Zwet, John Connolly and Craig McAngus. This blog is based on an article originally published in the British Journal of Politics and International Relations.